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Preface
The present is confusing because we do not really understand the past.
1
Our understandings of politics evolve. At one time -much of the first half of the 1900s -it was widely understood that presidential and House election results were closely tied together. The partisan votes for presidential and House candidates in House districts were very similar, and we presumed that voting was primarily for a party and not individuals. Then in the 1960s the relationship between presidential and House results declined. By the 1970s a new interpretation emerged about what was dominating elections and how the presidentialHouse connection was being altered. The conclusion was that House elections were becoming dominated by incumbency, elections were candidate-centered, and parties were of less relevance in voting choices. House incumbents were becoming more immune to shifts in partisan presidential electoral support in the nation. The conventional wisdom quickly became that we were witnessing a diminished capability for elections to simultaneously register voter sentiment in the institutions of the presidency and the House. Then evidence began to emerge that created doubts about the consensus. In the elections of 1996 and after, presidential and House election results were once more highly associated. The 2008 presidential and House election results appeared to be dominated by reactions to parties, not candidates. This renewed relationship is puzzling if we rely on an interpretation of the past -the 1950s-1980s -that presumes House incumbents have become independent of presidential voting. That interpretation does not explain how these two election results might once again be consistently closely associated. Was it just chance? Or was something much more systematic occurring? If the latter, had we perhaps misinterpreted the past, missed some intended and coherent source of change, and developed an understanding that was erroneous? Do we need to reinterpret the past to provide an explanation of the present?
This analysis argues that the answer to these last questions is yes. The argument presented here is that the separation of presidential and House results that occurred in the 1960s-1980s was not because candidates had suddenly figured out how to create personal constituencies. Rather, a lengthy and sometimes uncoordinated secular realignment was under way. Parties were not peripheral to the process but central. The process was party-driven. Parties were developing differing interpretations of what were the most important problems in American society. They were seeking constituencies compatible with these changing views. In the pursuit of change the wings of each party sometimes acted independently and sometimes together. As the process unfolded over decades, presidential and House results came apart and then gradually came back together. Incumbents lost or retired. Party control and partisan voting percentages in districts changed. By the mid-1990s most of the changes for both wings of each party had worked themselves out and results across districts were once again very similar.
